From bf33dc2d7ac42ff4c14a149b707a3ee47aa3d76f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jacob Champion Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 09:40:43 -0800 Subject: [PATCH v10 1/2] libpq: let client reject unexpected auth methods The require_auth connection option allows the client to choose a list of acceptable authentication types for use with the server. There is no negotiation: if the server does not present one of the allowed authentication requests, the connection fails. Additionally, all methods in the list may be negated, e.g. '!password', in which case the server must NOT use the listed authentication type. The special method "none" allows/disallows the use of unauthenticated connections (but it does not govern transport-level authentication via TLS or GSSAPI). Internally, the patch expands the role of check_expected_areq() to ensure that the incoming request is compatible with conn->require_auth. It also introduces a new flag, conn->client_finished_auth, which is set by various authentication routines when the client side of the handshake is finished. This signals to check_expected_areq() that an OK message from the server is expected, and allows the client to complain if the server forgoes authentication entirely. (Since the client can't generally prove that the server is actually doing the work of authentication, this last part is mostly useful for SCRAM without channel binding. It could also provide a client with a decent signal that, at the very least, it's not connecting to a database with trust auth, and so the connection can be tied to the client in a later audit.) Deficiencies: - This is unlikely to be very forwards-compatible at the moment, especially with SASL/SCRAM. - SSPI support is "implemented" but untested. - require_auth=none,scram-sha-256 currently allows the server to leave a SCRAM exchange unfinished. This is not net-new behavior but may be surprising. --- doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 105 ++++++++++++++ src/include/libpq/pqcomm.h | 1 + src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c | 1 + src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c | 136 ++++++++++++++++++ src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++++ src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 7 + src/test/authentication/t/001_password.pl | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++ src/test/kerberos/t/001_auth.pl | 26 ++++ src/test/ldap/t/001_auth.pl | 6 + src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 25 ++++ 10 files changed, 620 insertions(+) diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml index 3c9bd3d673..05d9645f40 100644 --- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml +++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml @@ -1220,6 +1220,101 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname + + require_auth + + + Specifies the authentication method that the client requires from the + server. If the server does not use the required method to authenticate + the client, or if the authentication handshake is not fully completed by + the server, the connection will fail. A comma-separated list of methods + may also be provided, of which the server must use exactly one in order + for the connection to succeed. By default, any authentication method is + accepted, and the server is free to skip authentication altogether. + + + Methods may be negated with the addition of a ! + prefix, in which case the server must not attempt + the listed method; any other method is accepted, and the server is free + not to authenticate the client at all. If a comma-separated list is + provided, the server may not attempt any of the + listed negated methods. Negated and non-negated forms may not be + combined in the same setting. + + + As a final special case, the none method requires the + server not to use an authentication challenge. (It may also be negated, + to require some form of authentication.) + + + The following methods may be specified: + + + + password + + + The server must request plaintext password authentication. + + + + + + md5 + + + The server must request MD5 hashed password authentication. + + + + + + gss + + + The server must either request a Kerberos handshake via + GSSAPI or establish a + GSS-encrypted channel (see also + ). + + + + + + sspi + + + The server must request Windows SSPI + authentication. + + + + + + scram-sha-256 + + + The server must successfully complete a SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication + exchange with the client. + + + + + + none + + + The server must not prompt the client for an authentication + exchange. (This does not prohibit client certificate authentication + via TLS, nor GSS authentication via its encrypted transport.) + + + + + + + + channel_binding @@ -7773,6 +7868,16 @@ myEventProc(PGEventId evtId, void *evtInfo, void *passThrough) + + + + PGREQUIREAUTH + + PGREQUIREAUTH behaves the same as the connection parameter. + + + diff --git a/src/include/libpq/pqcomm.h b/src/include/libpq/pqcomm.h index fcf68df39b..912451c913 100644 --- a/src/include/libpq/pqcomm.h +++ b/src/include/libpq/pqcomm.h @@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool Db_user_namespace; #define AUTH_REQ_SASL 10 /* Begin SASL authentication */ #define AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT 11 /* Continue SASL authentication */ #define AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN 12 /* Final SASL message */ +#define AUTH_REQ_MAX AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN /* maximum AUTH_REQ_* value */ typedef uint32 AuthRequest; diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c index 35cfd9987d..ad57df88b6 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c @@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ scram_exchange(void *opaq, char *input, int inputlen, } *done = true; state->state = FE_SCRAM_FINISHED; + state->conn->client_finished_auth = true; break; default: diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c index 49a1c626f6..5a46cf0ee9 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c @@ -137,7 +137,10 @@ pg_GSS_continue(PGconn *conn, int payloadlen) } if (maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + { + conn->client_finished_auth = true; gss_release_name(&lmin_s, &conn->gtarg_nam); + } return STATUS_OK; } @@ -326,6 +329,9 @@ pg_SSPI_continue(PGconn *conn, int payloadlen) FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer); } + if (r == SEC_E_OK) + conn->client_finished_auth = true; + /* Cleanup is handled by the code in freePGconn() */ return STATUS_OK; } @@ -830,6 +836,44 @@ pg_password_sendauth(PGconn *conn, const char *password, AuthRequest areq) return ret; } +/* + * Translate a disallowed AuthRequest code into an error message. + */ +static const char * +auth_description(AuthRequest areq) +{ + switch (areq) + { + case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD: + return libpq_gettext("server requested a cleartext password"); + case AUTH_REQ_MD5: + return libpq_gettext("server requested a hashed password"); + case AUTH_REQ_GSS: + case AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT: + return libpq_gettext("server requested GSSAPI authentication"); + case AUTH_REQ_SSPI: + return libpq_gettext("server requested SSPI authentication"); + case AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS: + return libpq_gettext("server requested UNIX socket credentials"); + case AUTH_REQ_SASL: + case AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT: + case AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN: + return libpq_gettext("server requested SASL authentication"); + } + + return libpq_gettext("server requested an unknown authentication type"); +} + +/* + * Convenience macro for checking the allowed_auth_methods bitmask. Caller must + * ensure that type is not greater than 31 (high bit of the bitmask). + */ +#define auth_allowed(conn, type) \ + (((conn)->allowed_auth_methods & (1 << (type))) != 0) + +StaticAssertDecl(AUTH_REQ_MAX < CHAR_BIT * sizeof(((PGconn){0}).allowed_auth_methods), + "AUTH_REQ_MAX overflows the allowed_auth_methods bitmask"); + /* * Verify that the authentication request is expected, given the connection * parameters. This is especially important when the client wishes to @@ -839,6 +883,95 @@ static bool check_expected_areq(AuthRequest areq, PGconn *conn) { bool result = true; + const char *reason = NULL; + + /* + * If the user required a specific auth method, or specified an allowed set, + * then reject all others here, and make sure the server actually completes + * an authentication exchange. + */ + if (conn->require_auth) + { + switch (areq) + { + case AUTH_REQ_OK: + /* + * Check to make sure we've actually finished our exchange (or + * else that the user has allowed an authentication-less + * connection). + * + * If the user has allowed both SCRAM and unauthenticated + * (trust) connections, then this check will silently accept + * partial SCRAM exchanges, where a misbehaving server does not + * provide its verifier before sending an OK. This is consistent + * with historical behavior, but it may be a point to revisit in + * the future, since it could allow a server that doesn't know + * the user's password to silently harvest material for a brute + * force attack. + */ + if (!conn->auth_required || conn->client_finished_auth) + break; + + /* + * No explicit authentication request was made by the server -- + * or perhaps it was made and not completed, in the case of + * SCRAM -- but there is one special case to check. If the user + * allowed "gss", then a GSS-encrypted channel also satisfies + * the check. + */ +#ifdef ENABLE_GSS + if (auth_allowed(conn, AUTH_REQ_GSS) && conn->gssenc) + { + /* + * If implicit GSS auth has already been performed via GSS + * encryption, we don't need to have performed an + * AUTH_REQ_GSS exchange. This allows require_auth=gss to be + * combined with gssencmode, since there won't be an + * explicit authentication request in that case. + */ + } + else +#endif + { + reason = libpq_gettext("server did not complete authentication"), + result = false; + } + + break; + + case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD: + case AUTH_REQ_MD5: + case AUTH_REQ_GSS: + case AUTH_REQ_SSPI: + case AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT: + case AUTH_REQ_SASL: + case AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT: + case AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN: + /* + * We don't handle these with the default case, to avoid + * bit-shifting past the end of the allowed_auth_methods mask if + * the server sends an unexpected AuthRequest. + */ + result = auth_allowed(conn, areq); + break; + + default: + result = false; + break; + } + } + + if (!result) + { + if (!reason) + reason = auth_description(areq); + + appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("auth method \"%s\" requirement failed: %s\n"), + conn->require_auth, reason); + + return result; + } /* * When channel_binding=require, we must protect against two cases: (1) we @@ -1040,6 +1173,9 @@ pg_fe_sendauth(AuthRequest areq, int payloadlen, PGconn *conn) "fe_sendauth: error sending password authentication\n"); return STATUS_ERROR; } + + /* We expect no further authentication requests. */ + conn->client_finished_auth = true; break; } diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c index 746e9b4f1e..40f571fadb 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c @@ -307,6 +307,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = { "Require-Peer", "", 10, offsetof(struct pg_conn, requirepeer)}, + {"require_auth", "PGREQUIREAUTH", NULL, NULL, + "Require-Auth", "", 14, /* sizeof("scram-sha-256") == 14 */ + offsetof(struct pg_conn, require_auth)}, + {"ssl_min_protocol_version", "PGSSLMINPROTOCOLVERSION", "TLSv1.2", NULL, "SSL-Minimum-Protocol-Version", "", 8, /* sizeof("TLSv1.x") == 8 */ offsetof(struct pg_conn, ssl_min_protocol_version)}, @@ -1240,6 +1244,166 @@ connectOptions2(PGconn *conn) } } + /* + * parse and validate require_auth option + */ + if (conn->require_auth) + { + char *s = conn->require_auth; + bool first, more; + bool negated = false; + + /* + * By default, start from an empty set of allowed options and add to it. + */ + conn->auth_required = true; + conn->allowed_auth_methods = 0; + + for (first = true, more = true; more; first = false) + { + char *method, *part; + uint32 bits; + + part = parse_comma_separated_list(&s, &more); + if (part == NULL) + goto oom_error; + + /* + * Check for negation, e.g. '!password'. If one element is negated, + * they all have to be. + */ + method = part; + if (*method == '!') + { + if (first) + { + /* + * Switch to a permissive set of allowed options, and + * subtract from it. + */ + conn->auth_required = false; + conn->allowed_auth_methods = -1; + } + else if (!negated) + { + conn->status = CONNECTION_BAD; + appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("negative require_auth method \"%s\" cannot be mixed with non-negative methods"), + method); + + free(part); + return false; + } + + negated = true; + method++; + } + else if (negated) + { + conn->status = CONNECTION_BAD; + appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("require_auth method \"%s\" cannot be mixed with negative methods"), + method); + + free(part); + return false; + } + + if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0) + { + bits = (1 << AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD); + } + else if (strcmp(method, "md5") == 0) + { + bits = (1 << AUTH_REQ_MD5); + } + else if (strcmp(method, "gss") == 0) + { + bits = (1 << AUTH_REQ_GSS); + bits |= (1 << AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT); + } + else if (strcmp(method, "sspi") == 0) + { + bits = (1 << AUTH_REQ_SSPI); + bits |= (1 << AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT); + } + else if (strcmp(method, "scram-sha-256") == 0) + { + /* This currently assumes that SCRAM is the only SASL method. */ + bits = (1 << AUTH_REQ_SASL); + bits |= (1 << AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT); + bits |= (1 << AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN); + } + else if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0) + { + /* + * Special case: let the user explicitly allow (or disallow) + * connections where the server does not send an explicit + * authentication challenge, such as "trust" and "cert" auth. + */ + if (negated) /* "!none" */ + { + if (conn->auth_required) + goto duplicate; + + conn->auth_required = true; + } + else /* "none" */ + { + if (!conn->auth_required) + goto duplicate; + + conn->auth_required = false; + } + + free(part); + continue; /* avoid the bitmask manipulation below */ + } + else + { + conn->status = CONNECTION_BAD; + appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("invalid require_auth method: \"%s\""), + method); + + free(part); + return false; + } + + /* Update the bitmask. */ + if (negated) + { + if ((conn->allowed_auth_methods & bits) == 0) + goto duplicate; + + conn->allowed_auth_methods &= ~bits; + } + else + { + if ((conn->allowed_auth_methods & bits) == bits) + goto duplicate; + + conn->allowed_auth_methods |= bits; + } + + free(part); + continue; + +duplicate: + /* + * A duplicated method probably indicates a typo in a setting where + * typos are extremely risky. + */ + conn->status = CONNECTION_BAD; + appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("require_auth method \"%s\" is specified more than once"), + part); + + free(part); + return false; + } + } + /* * validate channel_binding option */ diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h index c75ed63a2c..e4d88e22a1 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h @@ -396,6 +396,7 @@ struct pg_conn char *ssl_min_protocol_version; /* minimum TLS protocol version */ char *ssl_max_protocol_version; /* maximum TLS protocol version */ char *target_session_attrs; /* desired session properties */ + char *require_auth; /* name of the expected auth method */ /* Optional file to write trace info to */ FILE *Pfdebug; @@ -457,6 +458,9 @@ struct pg_conn bool write_failed; /* have we had a write failure on sock? */ char *write_err_msg; /* write error message, or NULL if OOM */ + bool auth_required; /* require an authentication challenge from the server? */ + uint32 allowed_auth_methods; /* bitmask of acceptable AuthRequest codes */ + /* Transient state needed while establishing connection */ PGTargetServerType target_server_type; /* desired session properties */ bool try_next_addr; /* time to advance to next address/host? */ @@ -512,6 +516,9 @@ struct pg_conn bool error_result; /* do we need to make an ERROR result? */ PGresult *next_result; /* next result (used in single-row mode) */ + bool client_finished_auth; /* have we finished our half of the + * authentication exchange? */ + /* Assorted state for SASL, SSL, GSS, etc */ const pg_fe_sasl_mech *sasl; void *sasl_state; diff --git a/src/test/authentication/t/001_password.pl b/src/test/authentication/t/001_password.pl index 93df77aa4e..ca8731d379 100644 --- a/src/test/authentication/t/001_password.pl +++ b/src/test/authentication/t/001_password.pl @@ -107,6 +107,74 @@ is($res, 't', "users with trust authentication use SYSTEM_USER = NULL in parallel workers" ); +# All positive require_auth options should fail... +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=gss", + "GSS authentication can be required: fails with trust auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server did not complete authentication/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=sspi", + "SSPI authentication can be required: fails with trust auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server did not complete authentication/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=password", + "password authentication can be required: fails with trust auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server did not complete authentication/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=md5", + "md5 authentication can be required: fails with trust auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server did not complete authentication/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=scram-sha-256", + "SCRAM authentication can be required: fails with trust auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server did not complete authentication/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=password,scram-sha-256", + "multiple authentication types can be required: fails with trust auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server did not complete authentication/); + +# ...and negative require_auth options should succeed. +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=!gss", + "GSS authentication can be forbidden: succeeds with trust auth"); +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=!sspi", + "SSPI authentication can be forbidden: succeeds with trust auth"); +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=!password", + "password authentication can be forbidden: succeeds with trust auth"); +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=!md5", + "md5 authentication can be forbidden: succeeds with trust auth"); +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=!scram-sha-256", + "SCRAM authentication can be forbidden: succeeds with trust auth"); +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=!password,!scram-sha-256", + "multiple authentication types can be forbidden: succeeds with trust auth"); + +# require_auth=[!]none should interact correctly with trust auth. +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=none", + "all authentication can be forbidden: succeeds with trust auth"); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=!none", + "any authentication can be required: fails with trust auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server did not complete authentication/); + +# Negative and positive require_auth options can't be mixed. +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=scram-sha-256,!md5", + "negative require_auth methods can't be mixed with positive", + expected_stderr => qr/negative require_auth method "!md5" cannot be mixed with non-negative methods/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=!password,scram-sha-256", + "positive require_auth methods can't be mixed with negative", + expected_stderr => qr/require_auth method "scram-sha-256" cannot be mixed with negative methods/); + +# require_auth methods can't be duplicated. +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=password,md5,password", + "require_auth methods can't be duplicated: positive case", + expected_stderr => qr/require_auth method "password" is specified more than once/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=!password,!md5,!password", + "require_auth methods can't be duplicated: negative case", + expected_stderr => qr/require_auth method "!password" is specified more than once/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=none,md5,none", + "require_auth methods can't be duplicated: none case", + expected_stderr => qr/require_auth method "none" is specified more than once/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=!none,!md5,!none", + "require_auth methods can't be duplicated: !none case", + expected_stderr => qr/require_auth method "!none" is specified more than once/); + +# Unknown require_auth methods are caught. +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=none,abcdefg", + "unknown require_auth methods are rejected", + expected_stderr => qr/invalid require_auth method: "abcdefg"/); + # For plain "password" method, all users should also be able to connect. reset_pg_hba($node, 'all', 'all', 'password'); test_conn($node, 'user=scram_role', 'password', 0, @@ -116,6 +184,33 @@ test_conn($node, 'user=md5_role', 'password', 0, log_like => [qr/connection authenticated: identity="md5_role" method=password/]); +# require_auth should succeed with a plaintext password... +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=password", + "password authentication can be required: works with password auth"); +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=!none", + "any authentication can be required: works with password auth"); +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=scram-sha-256,password,md5", + "multiple authentication types can be required: works with password auth"); + +# ...fail for other auth types... +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=md5", + "md5 authentication can be required: fails with password auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested a cleartext password/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=scram-sha-256", + "SCRAM authentication can be required: fails with password auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested a cleartext password/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=none", + "all authentication can be forbidden: fails with password auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested a cleartext password/); + +# ...and allow password authentication to be prohibited. +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=!password", + "password authentication can be forbidden: fails with password auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested a cleartext password/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=!password,!md5,!scram-sha-256", + "multiple authentication types can be forbidden: fails with password auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested a cleartext password/); + # For "scram-sha-256" method, user "scram_role" should be able to connect. reset_pg_hba($node, 'all', 'all', 'scram-sha-256'); test_conn( @@ -129,6 +224,33 @@ test_conn( test_conn($node, 'user=md5_role', 'scram-sha-256', 2, log_unlike => [qr/connection authenticated:/]); +# require_auth should succeed with SCRAM... +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=scram-sha-256", + "SCRAM authentication can be required: works with SCRAM auth"); +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=!none", + "any authentication can be required: works with SCRAM auth"); +$node->connect_ok("user=scram_role require_auth=password,scram-sha-256,md5", + "multiple authentication types can be required: works with SCRAM auth"); + +# ...fail for other auth types... +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=password", + "password authentication can be required: fails with SCRAM auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested SASL authentication/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=md5", + "md5 authentication can be required: fails with SCRAM auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested SASL authentication/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=none", + "all authentication can be forbidden: fails with SCRAM auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested SASL authentication/); + +# ...and allow SCRAM authentication to be prohibited. +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=!scram-sha-256", + "SCRAM authentication can be forbidden: fails with SCRAM auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested SASL authentication/); +$node->connect_fails("user=scram_role require_auth=!password,!md5,!scram-sha-256", + "multiple authentication types can be forbidden: fails with SCRAM auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested SASL authentication/); + # Test that bad passwords are rejected. $ENV{"PGPASSWORD"} = 'badpass'; test_conn($node, 'user=scram_role', 'scram-sha-256', 2, @@ -145,6 +267,33 @@ test_conn($node, 'user=md5_role', 'md5', 0, log_like => [qr/connection authenticated: identity="md5_role" method=md5/]); +# require_auth should succeed with MD5... +$node->connect_ok("user=md5_role require_auth=md5", + "MD5 authentication can be required: works with MD5 auth"); +$node->connect_ok("user=md5_role require_auth=!none", + "any authentication can be required: works with MD5 auth"); +$node->connect_ok("user=md5_role require_auth=md5,scram-sha-256,password", + "multiple authentication types can be required: works with MD5 auth"); + +# ...fail for other auth types... +$node->connect_fails("user=md5_role require_auth=password", + "password authentication can be required: fails with MD5 auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested a hashed password/); +$node->connect_fails("user=md5_role require_auth=scram-sha-256", + "SCRAM authentication can be required: fails with MD5 auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested a hashed password/); +$node->connect_fails("user=md5_role require_auth=none", + "all authentication can be forbidden: fails with MD5 auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested a hashed password/); + +# ...and allow MD5 authentication to be prohibited. +$node->connect_fails("user=md5_role require_auth=!md5", + "password authentication can be forbidden: fails with MD5 auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested a hashed password/); +$node->connect_fails("user=md5_role require_auth=!password,!md5,!scram-sha-256", + "multiple authentication types can be forbidden: fails with MD5 auth", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested a hashed password/); + # Test SYSTEM_USER <> NULL with parallel workers. $node->safe_psql( 'postgres', diff --git a/src/test/kerberos/t/001_auth.pl b/src/test/kerberos/t/001_auth.pl index a2bc8a5351..61aede12d1 100644 --- a/src/test/kerberos/t/001_auth.pl +++ b/src/test/kerberos/t/001_auth.pl @@ -318,6 +318,24 @@ test_query( 'gssencmode=require', 'sending 100K lines works'); +# require_auth=gss should succeed... +$node->connect_ok( + $node->connstr('postgres') . " user=test1 host=$host hostaddr=$hostaddr gssencmode=disable require_auth=gss", + "GSS authentication can be requested: works with GSS auth without encryption"); +$node->connect_ok( + $node->connstr('postgres') . " user=test1 host=$host hostaddr=$hostaddr gssencmode=require require_auth=gss", + "GSS authentication can be requested: works with GSS auth with encryption"); + +# ...and require_auth=sspi should fail. +$node->connect_fails( + $node->connstr('postgres') . " user=test1 host=$host hostaddr=$hostaddr gssencmode=disable require_auth=sspi", + "SSPI authentication can be requested: fails with GSS auth without encryption", + expected_stderr => qr/server requested GSSAPI authentication/); +$node->connect_fails( + $node->connstr('postgres') . " user=test1 host=$host hostaddr=$hostaddr gssencmode=require require_auth=sspi", + "SSPI authentication can be requested: fails with GSS auth with encryption", + expected_stderr => qr/server did not complete authentication/); + # Test that SYSTEM_USER works. test_query($node, 'test1', 'SELECT SYSTEM_USER;', qr/^gss:test1\@$realm$/s, 'gssencmode=require', 'testing system_user'); @@ -363,6 +381,14 @@ test_access( test_access($node, 'test1', 'SELECT true', 2, 'gssencmode=disable', 'fails with GSS encryption disabled and hostgssenc hba'); +# require_auth=gss should succeed. +$node->connect_ok( + $node->connstr('postgres') . " user=test1 host=$host hostaddr=$hostaddr gssencmode=require require_auth=gss", + "GSS authentication can be requested: works with GSS encryption"); +$node->connect_ok( + $node->connstr('postgres') . " user=test1 host=$host hostaddr=$hostaddr gssencmode=require require_auth=gss,scram-sha-256", + "multiple authentication types can be requested: works with GSS encryption"); + unlink($node->data_dir . '/pg_hba.conf'); $node->append_conf('pg_hba.conf', qq{hostnogssenc all all $hostaddr/32 gss map=mymap}); diff --git a/src/test/ldap/t/001_auth.pl b/src/test/ldap/t/001_auth.pl index 2f064f6944..25483e50cc 100644 --- a/src/test/ldap/t/001_auth.pl +++ b/src/test/ldap/t/001_auth.pl @@ -220,6 +220,12 @@ test_access( qr/connection authenticated: identity="uid=test1,dc=example,dc=net" method=ldap/ ],); +# require_auth=password should complete successfully; other methods should fail. +$node->connect_ok("user=test1 require_auth=password", + "password authentication can be required: works with ldap auth"); +$node->connect_fails("user=test1 require_auth=scram-sha-256", + "SCRAM authentication can be required: fails with ldap auth"); + note "search+bind"; unlink($node->data_dir . '/pg_hba.conf'); diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl index deaa4aa086..cf61bc7d0d 100644 --- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl +++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl @@ -136,4 +136,29 @@ $node->connect_ok( qr/connection authenticated: identity="ssltestuser" method=scram-sha-256/ ]); +# channel_binding should continue to function independently of require_auth. +$node->connect_ok("$common_connstr user=ssltestuser channel_binding=disable require_auth=scram-sha-256", + "SCRAM with SSL, channel_binding=disable, and require_auth=scram-sha-256"); +$node->connect_fails( + "$common_connstr user=md5testuser require_auth=md5 channel_binding=require", + "channel_binding can fail even when require_auth succeeds", + expected_stderr => + qr/channel binding required but not supported by server's authentication request/ +); +if ($supports_tls_server_end_point) +{ + $node->connect_ok( + "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require require_auth=scram-sha-256", + "SCRAM with SSL, channel_binding=require, and require_auth=scram-sha-256"); +} +else +{ + $node->connect_fails( + "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require require_auth=scram-sha-256", + "SCRAM with SSL, channel_binding=require, and require_auth=scram-sha-256", + expected_stderr => + qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/ + ); +} + done_testing(); -- 2.25.1