From 6e889e6ed4884cebb2c86cb3798ff35d9a20f67f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yugo Nagata Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2024 20:14:21 +0900 Subject: [PATCH v4 2/2] Doc: replace "leak-proof" in documents and comments with "leakproof" --- doc/src/sgml/catalogs.sgml | 2 +- doc/src/sgml/planstats.sgml | 2 +- doc/src/sgml/rules.sgml | 2 +- src/backend/statistics/extended_stats.c | 4 ++-- src/backend/utils/adt/selfuncs.c | 4 ++-- src/include/catalog/pg_proc.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/catalogs.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/catalogs.sgml index 238ed67919..d3036c5ba9 100644 --- a/doc/src/sgml/catalogs.sgml +++ b/doc/src/sgml/catalogs.sgml @@ -6040,7 +6040,7 @@ SCRAM-SHA-256$<iteration count>:&l The function has no side effects. No information about the arguments is conveyed except via the return value. Any function that might throw an error depending on the values of its arguments - is not leak-proof. + is not leakproof. diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/planstats.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/planstats.sgml index de30ac645e..b670d0af4d 100644 --- a/doc/src/sgml/planstats.sgml +++ b/doc/src/sgml/planstats.sgml @@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, TIMING OFF, BUFFERS OFF) SELECT * FROM t WHERE a <= 49 AND error, in which case this mechanism is invisible in practice. But if the user is reading from a security-barrier view, then the planner might wish to check the statistics of an underlying table that is otherwise - inaccessible to the user. In that case, the operator should be leak-proof + inaccessible to the user. In that case, the operator should be leakproof or the statistics will not be used. There is no direct feedback about that, except that the plan might be suboptimal. If one suspects that this is the case, one could try running the query as a more privileged user, diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/rules.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/rules.sgml index 74cd1d29fd..65a17f3065 100644 --- a/doc/src/sgml/rules.sgml +++ b/doc/src/sgml/rules.sgml @@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ CREATE VIEW phone_number WITH (security_barrier) AS LEAKPROOF to be pushed down, as they never receive data from the view. In contrast, a function that might throw an error depending on the values received as arguments (such as one that throws an error in the - event of overflow or division by zero) is not leak-proof, and could provide + event of overflow or division by zero) is not leakproof, and could provide significant information about the unseen rows if applied before the security view's row filters. diff --git a/src/backend/statistics/extended_stats.c b/src/backend/statistics/extended_stats.c index 34dcb535e1..a8b63ec088 100644 --- a/src/backend/statistics/extended_stats.c +++ b/src/backend/statistics/extended_stats.c @@ -1397,7 +1397,7 @@ statext_is_compatible_clause_internal(PlannerInfo *root, Node *clause, /* * If there are any securityQuals on the RTE from security barrier * views or RLS policies, then the user may not have access to all the - * table's data, and we must check that the operator is leak-proof. + * table's data, and we must check that the operator is leakproof. * * If the operator is leaky, then we must ignore this clause for the * purposes of estimating with MCV lists, otherwise the operator might @@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ statext_is_compatible_clause_internal(PlannerInfo *root, Node *clause, /* * If there are any securityQuals on the RTE from security barrier * views or RLS policies, then the user may not have access to all the - * table's data, and we must check that the operator is leak-proof. + * table's data, and we must check that the operator is leakproof. * * If the operator is leaky, then we must ignore this clause for the * purposes of estimating with MCV lists, otherwise the operator might diff --git a/src/backend/utils/adt/selfuncs.c b/src/backend/utils/adt/selfuncs.c index 93e4a8906c..d3d1e485bb 100644 --- a/src/backend/utils/adt/selfuncs.c +++ b/src/backend/utils/adt/selfuncs.c @@ -5763,7 +5763,7 @@ examine_simple_variable(PlannerInfo *root, Var *var, * Check whether it is permitted to call func_oid passing some of the * pg_statistic data in vardata. We allow this either if the user has SELECT * privileges on the table or column underlying the pg_statistic data or if - * the function is marked leak-proof. + * the function is marked leakproof. */ bool statistic_proc_security_check(VariableStatData *vardata, Oid func_oid) @@ -5778,7 +5778,7 @@ statistic_proc_security_check(VariableStatData *vardata, Oid func_oid) return true; ereport(DEBUG2, - (errmsg_internal("not using statistics because function \"%s\" is not leak-proof", + (errmsg_internal("not using statistics because function \"%s\" is not leakproof", get_func_name(func_oid)))); return false; } diff --git a/src/include/catalog/pg_proc.h b/src/include/catalog/pg_proc.h index fdb1e28071..b34b00aa3e 100644 --- a/src/include/catalog/pg_proc.h +++ b/src/include/catalog/pg_proc.h @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ CATALOG(pg_proc,1255,ProcedureRelationId) BKI_BOOTSTRAP BKI_ROWTYPE_OID(81,Proce /* security definer */ bool prosecdef BKI_DEFAULT(f); - /* is it a leak-proof function? */ + /* is it a leakproof function? */ bool proleakproof BKI_DEFAULT(f); /* strict with respect to NULLs? */ -- 2.34.1